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COMMUNICATION GAMES IN THE LANGUAGE CLASS
John Harvey
Many of us can remember a time, not so long ago, when almost every~
body seemed to be happy with what was going on in our foreign-language
classrooms. What was going on seemed to fit rather neatly with linguistic
theory and with psychological theory~-at least with American linguistic
theory and American psychological theory--and there seemed to be every
prospect that it would work.
Nowadays, much the same sort of thing is going on in our foreign~
language classrooms--most of them~ most of the time--but hardly anybody
seems to be happy with it. For one thing, it no longer seems to be upto-date 'theoretically. For another, it doesn't seem to work very well
after all.
But what else ;s there?
Well, there are several new cults: the Silent Way, Counsel-learning,
iSuggestopedia. I call them 'cults', perhaps unfairly, to try to suggest
what I find uncomfortable about them. Each of them seems to have its guru
and true believers. Each of them seems to be wrapped around a central Inystery. Each of them seems to be presented more in terms of revelation than
in terms of argument and evidence. I find something of interest in each
of them, but less than I am asked to find, and less than I am looking for.
In particular, I find very little about language.
We should keep our minds open. Certainly the claims of the cUltists
are impressive, and any validation would be exciting. But my hunch is that
something else will be needed to fill the bill.
Another alternative, of a very different sort, is individualization.
This is an alternative with a vengeance. With all our debate over drill
and bait theory, we have almost forgotten that the audiolingual theory was
originally just that, a theory that put the spoken language first. Unless
we want an alternative to that, to putting the spoken language first. we
presumably don't want our students doing their homework in class,
Again, of course, I'm being unfair. We do need to cope with the
problems presented by widely different abilities, learning styles, and
interests. Somehow. But not by turning the teacher into a file clerk.
That is probably enough on the alternatives I am not going to consider, although the ones I have mentioned and others I have not do deserve
serious study. The alternative I am going to consider is not yet institutionalized enough to be called a movement. It is not yet a tidy body of
doctrine. It has hardly begun to become available in the form of materials.
But I do think it is a definite trend.
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More and more, perhaps starting with John Carroll (1952), people havel
been saying that communication is what is lacking. There has been relatively little effort to define the concept of communication in terms of
language and language learning, and not much has been suggested as to how ~
to make communication happen in the classroom. I should mention, parenthetically, that Gerald Dykstra stands out as an exception to both
these statements. But the word 'communication' is everywhere, and behind
the word, I suggest, is an idea whose time has come. I use the cliche
deliberately, since I can't think of a better way of expressing the convergence of several lines of thought into an inevitable idea, into an idea
which occurs to any number of people at roughly the same time.
Not that the idea doesn't have a history of its own. Like everything
else in language learning, it probably has a pre~history. I just think
that the present explosion of interest in communication has been set off
by fairly recent developments in linguistics and in related sciences. In
particular, despite Chomsky's disclaimers, I think it has been inspired
by the rise of transformational grammar, which has brought new respect
for the depth, complexity, and creativity of language.
I said earlier, without naming names, that the audiolingual method,
and the structural linguistics and behaviorist psychology which were
supposed to buttress it, are no longer in good theoretical repute. I am
reasonably sure I said it w~thout objection. I went on to express my
misgivings about the theoretical supports of the Silent Way, Counsellearning, and Suggestopedia, and I stated flatly that individualization
was throwing the baby out with the bathwater--the baby being the idea of
the primacy of speech, and the bathwater being particular mindless classroom activities intended to implement that idea. Now let me sketch the
kind of theory that I think can be developed as a basis for a communicative
approach to language learning.
Since we are talking about learning language, we need some sort of a
model of learning. The model I propose is essentially contained in a
single, simple slogan: learning by doing. There is nothing very novel or
particularly sophisticated about this idea, but I think ita takes on some
novelty and some sophistication if we apply it in a deep sense rather than
in a surface sense. In other words, I am not talking about what the
student appears to be doing, I am talking about what he is really doing.
And I'm saying that that is what he is really learning.

-,

If you ask me whether Jennifer is learning to ride her bicycle, and
there she is pedaling along tilted ten degrees off to the right supported
by her right training wheel, I say that she isn't. She may be learning to
pedal, but she is not learning to balance, which is the whole trick. Now,
I will admit--I have to admit for my later argument~-that there are degrees
of approximation. If Jennifer starts to get up off that right training
wheel for a few yards at a time, she is closer to riding a bicycle, and
therefore closer to learning to ride it. But we still can't leave that
right training wheel out of our analysis of the learning situation. Certainly she isn't leaving it out of hers.

.
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We want the language learner to use the language. That's how he's
going to learn to use it. But we have to be sure that he's really using
it, not just appearing to use it.
On the surface level, one student utterance of a given sentence may
be roughly equivalent to any other; But we have a pretty good idea of how
different they may be on a deep level. One student utterance of the sentence might be repetition after the teacher. Another might be recall from
a memorized dialogue. Another might be manipulation on cue. We can't
count these as real use of the language. Then another might be free creation and urgent expression. That's a different matter.
It is true that these differences are differences in what is taking
place inside a black box. But that does not mean that they are beyond
knowing. If you can hang a man on circumstantial evidence--and I think you
can--, then you can hang a learning model on it. So the learning model
sets up a requirement for a performance model on it. So the learning model
inside the black box, given the inputs and the outputs. With a better
idea of what real language use involves, we'll be in a better position to
make it happen.
We need some sort of model of the performance of the speaker and some
sort of model of the performance of the hearer--or perhaps, since
specialization is seldom carried that far, some sort of model of the performance of the speaker/hearer. If we consult the linguist and the
psychologist, we will come away with something less than a scientific
model of performance. But we will not come away empty handed.
The linguist is likely to insist on components to deal with semantics,
syntax, phonology, and lexicon, or some such breakdown. The psychologist
is likely to insist on general cognitive components to deal with knowledge,
logic, and imagination, at least, and on affective components certainly
including drives and inhibitions. Notice that this does not pretend to be
an exhaustive listing or a definitive categorization. But it does give an
idea of the number and variety of components that will be needed for a
working model.
Our consultants will undoubtedly warn, further, that each of these
components will be internally complex, and that each of them will be related to each of the others in complex ways. Take the syntactic component
of the performance model, for example. We could hardly expect it to be
significantly simpler than the syntactic components of current competence
models. Again, think back over the debate as to what, if anything, is
wrong with one of the highest-frequency sentences in the English language,
'Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.' We can take the intensity of
that debate as a measure of the inti:macy of the relations between syntax
and semantics, and between these linguistic components and the general
cognitive components dealing with knowledge, logic, and imagination. And
this is not even to mention the positive and negative affect aroused by
that sentence.
Obviously, this performance model is almost as sketchy as my learning
model. At the time, it is overambitious in the present state of the art,
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and probably will be in any foreseeable state of the art. I am only saying
that we must take into account every factor that we know, intuitively, to
be important. I don't think that the models of learning and performance
explicit or implicit in current language-teaching methods do. I think that
they fail to do justice to much of what we know or have reason to suspect·
about the mind and about language.
One thing we know to be important, or have very good reason to suspect
is important, was left out of my performance model. I mentioned earlier
that every speaker is a hearer, and vice versa, or that everybody is a
speaker/hearer. But r have not mentioned the obvious fact that every
speaker requires a hearer, and vice versa, or that every speaker/hearer
requires another. In other words, the performance model needs to be expanded into a communication model. There are obvious counter-examples to
any claim that language is purely a communicative device, but none of them
would seem to weigh heavily against regarding language as first and foremost a communicative device.
The speaker's performance cannot be understood without considering his
mental representation of the hearer. I offer two thought experiments to
illustrate this. First, imagine yourself writing, ~to whom it may concern',
a letter explaining why you have decided not to attend the party the Joneses
are throwing next Saturday. Don't you find yourself wondering whom it
might concern after all? What if itts somebody who has never heard of the
Joneses? What if it's the Joneses? Next, imagine yourself conveying substantially the same explanation to your spouse. Would you need to be so
explicit or so tactful? Would you even need to be articulate?
But it doesn't stop here. The hearer's performance cannot be understood without considering his mental representation of the speaker. Imagine
yourself opening a letter. Don't you look at the letterhead or the signature first?
Actually, it doesn't stop here, either. The speaker's representation
of the hearer has to include an estimate of the hearer's representation of
the speaker. And vice versa. And so on.
Communication is nothing if not a cybernetic process, We have seen
that speaker and hearer are looped together in terms of what has been
called 'feed-forward', that is, in terms of their intentions and expectations. They are also looped together, of course, in terms of feedback.
Both speaker and hearer need feedback on the extent to which the message
sent was equivalent to the message received. If this feedback doesn't come
immediately from what the other party says or does, it should come at some
time from some source. Something has to result from what has been said and
from how it has been understood, if communication is not to break down,
As soon as we put the subjective performances of speaker and hearer
together into a communication model, we realize that there is an objective
relationship between them, namely what in fact the speaker communicates to
the hearer. This is a function not only of what the speaker says but also
of what the hearer already knows. We have arrived, of course, at the basic
concept of information theory, in which the amount of information is
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measured by the unpredictability of the message -- technically by the number of yes/no questions which the hearer would need to select the message
from the array of likely messages.
Notice that this measure of communication means that we cantt judge
the performance of the speaker just on the basis of what he says. We have
to ask ourselves whether he has really told anybody anything -- that is,
whether he has told anybody anything they didn't already know. Nor can we
judge the performance of the hearer just on the basis of how he responds.
We have to ask ourselves whether he could have responded that way anyway.
To anticipate, the implications of this for the language classroom are
immense. Most of what normally passes for real use of the language fails
to meet the test.
Let's trace the path of one communication event through this model,
not even trying to touch all the bases.
The speaker starts out with some knowledge of the total situation,
including an estimate of what the hearer knows about it. The speaker
also has something he wants, something he can only get if the hearer is
better informed. He therefore formulates a message -- for simplicity,
let's think of it as prelinguistic, what he wants to say rather than how
he is going to say it --, shaping this message to fit what he thinks the
hearer knows and what he thinks the hearer needs to be told. He then
processes the message linguistically -- looking up lexical items, applying
semantic, syntactic, and phonological rules -- to encode it into a signal.
For our present purposes we may equate the signal with the surface
structure.
The hearer processes the signal linguistically to decode it into a
possible message. He checks it against his knowledge of the situation,
including his estimate of what the speaker knows, and knows about him.
If it doesn't make sense, he may recycle it. If it does, he takes what
is new to him in the message and adds it to his knowledge. This may in
turn affect what he wants -- as the speaker intended.
But we have not yet completed the path of the communication event.
Some clue has to loop back from the hearer to the speaker that the message
he sent was the message received, and some clue has to loop back from the
speaker to the hearer that the message he received was the message sent.
My essential claim is that students will learn a spoken language in
the classroom just to the extent that what they do in the classroom
approximates this communication model.
To help in examlnlng this claim, let me extract three key features
from the communication model, features I have gotten into the habit of
calling reference, intention, and uncertainty. I think these three
features, taken together, most clearly point up what the communicative
approach requires and what it offers.
First, the reference feature. The reference recognizes that communication, to be communication, must first of all be about something.
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A word, a phrase, or a sentence has reference if it points to
something in particular. There must be a referential framework, a
definable state of affiars consisting of everything taken to be the
case, a total situation specified by the total information available.
Among other things, it must be reasonably clear who is talking to whom,
when, and where.
If the learner says, for example, 'The book is on the table. " we
should ask ourselves whether he has in mind any particular book, any
particular table, and any particular configuration of book and table. He
might not. He might just be producing a well-formed string. If that is
the case, it may well be because no universe of discourse including any
particular book on any particular table has been established.
The objection that there is always some book on some table in the
classroom, by the way, doesn't hold. For one thing, I could come up with
an elephant in a Volkswagen. And the question would be, what elephant in
what Volkswagen? Or rather, do we have any way of knowing?
Referentiality makes it possible for what is said to be judged true
or false, sensible or nonsensical, appropriate or out of place. It insists
that what is said be open to confirmation or disconfirmation. It lays the
basis for feedback.
~Jhen we communicate in our own language, our referential framework is
simply the world as we know it, or any part of it. But the world is too
wide for the language learner--by definition. If he could talk about
anything he might have in mind, he wouldn't be a learner, or at least he
would be a very advanced learner. On the other hand the classroom is
too narrow, except for the merest beginner. There just isn't enough there
to talk about for very long, or enough the learner needs to learn to talk
about. Somehow, then, we have to arrange to bring samples of the world
into the classroom, representations of parts of reality which are limited
enough not to overchallenge the learner's abilities but rich enough to
exploit those abilities.

Most current instruction is based on a script of some sort, a dialogue
or narrative which is learned thoroughly and then forms the basis for a
certain amount of discussion. This script does provide a r~ferential
framework, almost always a carefully limited one, although seldom a
sufficiently rich one. Strangely enough, however, it is precisely in those
parts of current instruction which aim at communication where the situation
is inadequately characterized. In free conversation, for example, more
often than not the learner finds himself in a referential limbo,
Recently, in a Chinese class in Washington, I heard the teacher ask a
student 'Has your wife come here with you?' It was a question the student
could understand--just-- and one he knew how to answer in the affirmative
or the negative. But there was no context whatsoever. If the reference
was to the real world, and assuming he had a wife, the student could take
'here' to refer to the classroom or to the school or to Washington, each
perhaps calling for a different answer, and he had no idea how to give an
elaborate answer such as 'She came to Washington with me, but she hasn!t
come to school with me today. I If something else was supposed to count as
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real, what was it? Was he perhaps being cast in the role of Mr. King in
the text, whose wife has indeed accompanied him, to China? Or was he
being invited to cook up an answer? Well, in that case, the affirmative
would be much easier.
Whatever was going on in this reference-free exchange, it was certainly not communication.
Next, the intention feature. The intention feature recognizes that
communication, to be communication, must be purposeful, must be to some
end.
There is an obvious affective sense in which unmotivated speech falls
short of communication, but there is also a crucial cognitive sense. Just
as important as feedback in the communication model -- and therefore in
the learning model-- is 'feed-forward'. The speaker's intentions, and
the hearer's expectations, give sharpness and weight to the feedback.
There is increasing evidence to suggest that, unless a hypothesis is
being tested, the data will seldom surrender or volunteer any meaning.
It would be ideal to be able to harness the learner's real-life intentions, but unfortunately these have little standing in the classroom.
There are levels of intention on which this is not true, of course, The
learner's intention to learn the language is clearly relevant. His intention to leave when the bell rings is clearly exploitable, perhaps by
insisting on a leave-taking ritual. But most of the time, as things stand,
the learner can't say anything he has any reason to say, and has no reason
to say anything he can say.
Somehow, then, we must arrange for the learner to have moment-tomoment reasons to use the language he has. By far the simplest way-is to
give him one big reason and let the small ones follow naturally from it as
things develop.
Finally, the uncertainty feature. The uncertainty feature recognizes
that communication, to be communication, must overcome unpredictability.
If communication is the resolution of uncertainty, there has to be
uncertainty to resolve. But if all the information has been made public
by the time communication is supposed to begin, if nothing has been withheld, nothing really remains to be said. Behavior superficically resembling communication may ensue, but its redundancy will be nearly absolute. This is the case with most classroom discussion of the classroom.
Everybody knows that Mrs. King accompanies her husband to China, and that
the book is on the table. Nobody can inform anybody of either fact. In
a way, we're back to spouse talking to spouse. Speaker and hearer share
so much information that there is no point in being articulate. All the
machinery of an articulate utterance would be spinning its wheels rather
than functioning to convey meaning.
But, of course, how that machinery functionsto convey meaning is
precisely what we want the learner to learn, and he will only learn it by
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seeing it in operation and by operating it. Unless he can observe how
form and content crucially depend on one another, unless he gets to try
fitting one to the other, he will never work out the complex relationship
between a sentence and its meaning--which ~ the language.
Or, to put it another way, the evidence of the relationship between
a sentence and its meaning is no more available in the absence of the
meaning than it would be in the absence of the sentence.
The communicative approach offers a simple remedy. It arranges for
different people to know different things. The total information about
the situation is divided up, perhaps with some overlap, but with everybody
screened off from some part of it. At the same time, of course, a requirement is built in for wider distribution of the information. Everybody has
a need to know what others know, and has a need for others to know what he
knows. It goes without saying that the only licensed channel for the
transfer of information is the target language.
My colleague John Francis and I have been working for some time--in
connection with the development of a Peace Corps Korean course, a private
school program in French and Spanish, a French immersion program, and a
government-sponsored Chinese course--to devise classroom activities along
these lines. What we have come up with we call communication ames. I
understand that Adrian Palmer and Margot Kimball of t e University of Utah
used the same term in a paper they presented to the TESOL Conference in
Miami. I haven't seen their paper, but I wouldn't be at all surprised to
find considerable convergence in substance as well as in terminology. And
I wonder if they don't share some of our misgivings about the term, despite
its inevitability.
The word Igames has the drawback of suggesting a lack of seriousness,
except perhaps in competitiveness. But our communication games are not
intended as diversions from the hard work of language learning, or as rewards for it, but rather as the hard work itself. In fact, if there is
one thing about them that is not serious, it is the occasional element of
competition. Usually, everybody 'wins'.
l

These communication games are game-line in the sense that they stimulate purposeful human interaction, and in the further sense that they are
purposeful human interaction, on a different level. Like games, they are
based on made-up situations, with roles to play, rules to follow, and goals
to pursue within those situations.
Once taken seriously, communication games often turn out to be diverting and rewarding after all. But it is important to realize, I think, that
this windfall profit derives not so much from the simulation of reality ;as
from the reality of communication itself. They are games, but they are
communication games. Success in them hinges on the successful exchange of
information. It is not at all a :.bad feeling to be putting the!ilanguage to
work. It is an even better feeling when, the more you use it, the better
you can use it. These feelings are nature's way of telling you that you
are functioning properly as a language-using, language-learning animal.
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Let's take a look at a simple communication game played in the sixth
unit of the Chinese course r mentioned. (Incidentally, there are 58 communication games in 39 units, and something like one-third of all class
time is devoted to them) This game is designed to contrast the new expression 'to work at (some place)' with the old expressions Ito be at
(some place)' and 'to live at (some place)'. This is not a matter of
simple lexical substitution, as it appears in English, but rather a matter
of three different constructions which cast the same morpheme in the
different roles of verb, verbal suffix, and preposition. So it needs work.
Since we aren't actually playing the game -- I wish we could -- we
can cheat and look at the teacher's answer sheet, which represents the
total situation. This consists of four copies of a street map showing
three named office buildings on one side of the street and three named
hotels on the other side. Each of these copies of the map is marked to
show where one persons works (any of the three office buildings), where
he lives (any of the three hotels), and where he happens to be now (any
of the six buildings). Since this is a game of what we call the 'Science'
type, in which the players try to make out significant regularities in the
data and base predictions on them, the situation has been rigged: each of
the four people is shown as staying at the hotel across the street from
his office building, and each of them is at his hotel now.
Now let's look at the worksheets the players are given. There are
four different worksheets, one for each group of the four players in a
group. Each worksheet is generally like the answer sheet, with four
street maps to represent the facts about the four people, except that only on
one of the street maps -- a different one on each player's work sheet -is marked those facts.
Each player, then, knows about one person and needs to know about the
other three if he is to work out the significant regularity in the situation, and the only way he can find out about the other three people is to
talk with the other three players. This choreographic pattern, by the
way, in which each player pairs off with every other player in turn, we
call 'milling'. Notice that it has the effect that each learner is
talking half the time, and being talked to directly the other half.
In a game of the 'Science' type, each player gathers information
using question-word questions, coding it on his worksheet as he goes,
until he is able to form a hypothesis about the significant regularity.
Then he tests his hypothesis by making predictions with yes/no questions
or, better, with slightly more yes than no questions. A hit counts as a
hit, a miss as a miss.
I chose a simple example, at the risk of having it appear trivial,
although anyone who has been involved in the first fifty or so hours of a
language course may recognize that this Science game i~ considerably more
demanding than most classwork at that level. It may be worthwhile, now,
to suggest what a communication game of the 'Science' type but at a much
more advanced level might look like.
Imagine that each player is given a dossier defining his role in
terms of socioeconomic background and political opinions, and that he
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is then to proceed as in my simpler example, this time specifically as a
social scientist whose research objective is to uncover correlations such
as 'well-off people with children eighteen and under tend to favor higher
local expenditures for schools, unless they happen to be conservatives.'
For fun, we might allow him to uncover such idiosyncratic exceptions as
one poor and childless citizen who also favors higher expenditures for
schools, on the grounds that he wishes he had had a chance to go to school
himself.
In general, we have found the Science paradigm to be extremely productive across all levels and for most kinds of material. Other game types
are most restricted in range, all the way down to a one-shot type like 3-D
Tic-Tac-Toe, which so far, at least, has only been used to practice giving
directions inside a building. Game types differ in many other ways than
in range of application. We have identified more than a dozen ~ndependent
variables which interact to produce a variety we have hardly begun to explore.
If you think back over the two versions of 'Science' I have described,
I think you will agree that the reference feature, the intention feature,
and the uncertainty feature of the communication approach are all there.
The situation is defined by the full set of worksheets. The overall goal,
to find the pattern--and, implicity, to help others find the pattern--,
motivates the production and comprehension of each question and each
answer. The division of information is accomplished by the provision of
a different worksheet to each of the players.
A workshop would be a better setting for discussion of the nuts-andbolts aspect of developing and implementing communication games. I
would like to mention, however, that each game is preceded by a 'briefing',
a run-through of a stripped-down version of the game which gives the
teacher a chance to demonstrate it to the whole class, and to make sure
that they are ready for it, and that each game is followed by a 'debriefing', a general discussion of the toal situation which has been uncovered
which gives the teacher a chance to check up on what learning has taken
place, and to deal with any difficulties which have arisen. I should also
mention, although it is perhaps obvious, the very different role of the
teacher in this kind of learning activity. Except during the briefing and
debriefing, when he has the class in his usual firm grip, the teacheriis
likely to feel a bit left out. He shouldn't be, however. Besides functioning as a roaming linguistic monitor and linguistic resource~ he may participate as a player himself and therefore function as a linguistic model for
one group at a time, and at all times he remains the classroom manager,
which in this case involves trouble-shooting the game,
hwould like to close on a more uplifting note. In the Chinese
course the games are a follow-through on material presented and practiced
earlier in the unit. That's probably the way they should be introduced
into classroom practice. In fact, I think their spread into other courses
in other languages should probably proceed by piggybacking a game here and
a game there onto existing materials. I invite you all to try it. But I
would like to think that communication games, despite their undignified
name, have a more central role to play. I would like to see a course
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built around a sequence of communication games, with any other necessary
inputs downgraded to the function of priming the learner for the games.
11m not sure that almost all presentation and practice of the material
couldn't take place in a communicative context, with a great deal of
openness to learner initiative in what gets learned. Anyway, it IS worth
a try.

